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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the Summary 
Judgment for American Self Storage in reforming rent-rate increases 
in violation of the Rental Agreement notification requirements, as 
to a required threshold, prior to becoming effective? 
II. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the Summary 
Judgment for American Self Storage in not recognizing rent-rate 
decreases not subject to Rental Agreement notification requirements, 
as to a required threshold, prior to becoming effective? 
III. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the Summary 
Judgment for American Self storage in not recognizing the Appellant's 
rights to peaceable possession of the Respondent's premises in 
violation of the Rental Agreement termination requirements? 
IV. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the Summary 
Judgment for American Self Storage in not recognizing the Appellant's 
counterclaim rights against the Respondent for locking the rent-paid 
storage unit doors for a period of time in excess of five (5) months? 
V. Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the Summary 
Judgment for American Self Storage in not determining if a 
conflicting, unsigned and unfiled Deposition supplanted with the 
Attorney's canned Affidavit, for the same witness, for the same day 
at the same time, and notarized by himself, constitutes an act of 
fraud, when relied upon and utilized to obtain a Summary Judgment? 
VI. Have the Appellant, his spouse, and his children been 
stripped of their household, personal and business property in 




Pursuant to Rule 43(2) (3) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court, the Petitioner here, Respondent below, asserts that the Utah 
Court of Appeals has rendered a decision in this case in a way that 
is in conflict with the established legal precedents of this Court, 
and has departed so far from the accepted and usual course of 
judicial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court's 
supervision. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
This action involves various claims against the Defendant-
Appellant/Petitioner brought by the Plaintiff-Respondent when the 
rent-paid for storage unit facilities was increased, then decreased, 
then increased, then decreased. The Plaintiff-Respondent locked the 
Defendant-Appellant's rent-paid storage unit doors beginning May 1988 
through September 10, 1988, in violation of the implied covenant— 
to undisturbed access—and in violation of the Utah Forcible Detainer 
Statute Utah Code 78-36-2(1) causing damages to the Defendant-
Appellant for trover and conversion of the Defendant-Appellant's 
business property. The Plaintiff-Respondent denied this when 
accepting the cash rent for August and September 1988. Consequently, 
the Defendant-Appellant calculated lost earnings from historical 
earnings records and presented a lien to the Respondent commencing 
October 1988 through July 1989, which was recognized, received and 
accented with the appropriate and timely monthly amortizations, for 
the properly noticed rent. The Plaintiff-Respondent brought an 
action for unlawful detainer and restitution of the premises 
commencing January 20, 1989. The Defendant-Appellant counterclaimed 
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for breach of contract centered on locking the Appellant's rent-paid 
storage unit doors. The Trial Court granted a Summary Judgment 
against the Defendant-Appellant without a trial and without any 
consideration for the Defendant-Appellant's counterclaim. The 
Plaintiff-Respondent, despite a previous warning, executed the 
Summary Judgment against the Defendant-Appellant, maliciously selling 
all of the Appellant's, his spouse's, and his children's household, 
personal, and business property, including the Exempt Property. The 
Defendant-Appellant disputed with the trial court and the Plaintiff-
Respondent as to real poverty, and accountability of property sold 
during Oral Arguments for bonding for the appeal. Subsequent to Oral 
Arguments, the Respondent's improperly noticed supplemental relief 
motion—the judicial entrapment, for which the Appellant was 
unprepared, was granted—the immediate retaliatory implementation of 
the supplemental relief proceedings—whereby the Defendant-Appellant 
spent eight (8) days in the Utah County jail. This was unlawful 
incarceration under the color of the alleged contempt of court in 
violation of his U.S. Constitutional Rights 5th and 14th Amendments-
-for not answering specific questions as requested by the Plaintiff-
Respondent, and the trial court. The Defendant-Appellant has 
included the ensuing actions by the Plaintiff-Respondent and the 
trial court in the appropriately filed Amended Docketing Statement 
dated November 20, 1989. 
The trial court (Honorable John Backlund) denied the Defendant's 
Motion for Dismissal and granted the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, which included dismissal of the Defendant's Counterclaim 
with prejudice (R at 48). The actual order reflecting this ruling 
was entered by the trial court on June 15, 1989. A copy is attached 
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hereto. The trial court denied the Defendant's motions for a new 
trial. This ruling was entered by the trial court on July 20, 1989, 
(R at 15). A copy is attached hereto. The Defendant applied to the 
Utah Court of Appeals for an Extraordinary Writ Case No. 890455-CA 
on July 21, 1989, similar to White v. District Court of Utah County, 
232 P.2d 785 (Utah 1951), with the order denying the Extraordinary 
Writ dated July 25, 1989. A copy is attached hereto. The Defendant 
applied to the Utah Court of Appeals for a directed verdict, a new 
trial, and to amend Appellant's Counterclaim. The order denying 
these motions dated August 1, 1989, is attached hereto. The 
Defendant applied to the Utah Court of Appeals with a Summary 
Judgment Motion to reverse and remand for trial. The order denying 
this motion dated September 14, 1989, is attached hereto. The Utah 
Court of Appeals applied Rule 31 of the Utah Court of Appeals Rules 
affirming the decisions of the trail court. The order dated June 5, 
1990, reflecting this decision is attached hereto. The Defendant 
applied to the Utah Court of Appeals with a Petition for Rehearing 
filed June 15, 1990. The order denying this petition dated July 2, 
1990, is attached hereto. 
B. Statement of Facts 
The Respondent has painted, where all can see, on the outside 
of the storage unit walls facing Interstate 15 near the American 
Fork, Utah 5th East exit the professed claim: 
"Electronic Security. R.V. and Boat spaces. 
Personal and Business. You Keep the Key.H 
whereby the Respondent explicitly implies a covenant to any tenant 
needing their facilities that the property is protected for both 
personal and business stored in their facilities and the tenant has 
undisturbed access, thus keeping the key. 
-4-
The Appellant entered into a month-to-month Rental Agreement, 
which was provided, and required by the Respondent, as a condition 
of renting their facilities, on June 12, 1987, (R at 74) for storage 
unit Nos. 143 and 144 at the agreed monthly rental rate of $55 per 
month for both units. A copy of the Rental Agreement is attached 
hereto. 
The Respondent properly notified the rent-rate to increase 
February 1, 1988, to $80 per month for both units. 
The Respondent properly notified the rent-rate to decrease 
beginning May 1, 1988 to $55 per month for both units (Exhibit 3), 
(R at 70). 
The Respondent accepted the appropriate amount of rent at $55 
per month (Exhibit 3 and 4), (R at 70) yet locked the Appellants 
rent-paid storage unit doors beginning May 1988 through September 10, 
1988 (R at 56 p.3 par. 14). The Respondent persisted in violation 
of each (A) the implied covenant to undisturbed access, and (B) the 
Utah Forcible Detainer Statute 78-36-2(1), despite the appropriate 
Appellant written warnings, which were served on the Respondent 
(Exhibits 4B,4C, and 4E) (R at 70), but to no avail. 
The Respondent, finally properly noticed and increased the rent 
to $94 per month for both units to begin October 1, 1988. (Exhibit 
6) (R at 70). 
The Respondent failed and refused to recognize any damages for 
trover and conversion, on September 10, 1988, when unlocking the 
Appellant's rent-paid storage unit doors. 
The Appellant properly calculated a lien and served the 
Respondent with the appropriate amortization for rent commencing 
October 10, 1988, (Exhibit 8) (R at 70). 
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The Respondent properly noticed and decreased the rent-rate 
retroactively for October 1988 and to commence from November 1, 1988 
to be $40 per month for both units (Exhibit 7) (R at 70). 
Despite a previous written warning (Exhibit 8 dated October 10, 
1988) (R at 70), the Respondent locked the Appellant's properly 
amortized rent-paid storage unit doors (R at 56 p.3 par, 23) for the 
period of time November 10, 1988, through January 5, 1989. 
The Appellant provided proper amortizations, of his lien from 
October 1988 through July 1989 (Exhibits 8) (R at 70) (Exhibits 9) 
(R at 49) and (Exhibit 10) (R at 23). 
During the Appellant's published absence (R at 44 p. 2 par.5) the 
Respondent broke into the Appellant's properly amortized rent-paid 
storage unit doors rummaging and pilfering the Appellant's, his 
spouse's and his children's property in violation of Utah Judicial 
Code Nos. 78-36-1 "Forcible Entry", and 78-36-2(2) "Forcible 
Detainer", 78-36-9 "Peaceable Possession", U.S. Constitution 4th and 
14th Amendments (R at 42). The Appellant upon returning petitioned 
the trial court for a Stay of Execution granted (R at 33) and 
accountability, but it was not granted (R at 31) and (R at 32). 
The Appellant served the Respondent with a Notice of Appeal, a 
Property Bond, Utah Judicial Code No. 78-36-8.5. A copy is attached 
hereto, to no avail. Since the Respondent ignored and sold the 
remaining unpilfered property July 25, 1989, at 12 noon. Lucky I 
moved to Utah and especially Utah County—the reported fraud capital 
of the U.S. 
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENTS: There exists several genuine issues 
of material fact which should defeat the Respondent's Summary 
Judgment. 
ARGUMENT - ISSUE I 
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THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR 
AMERICAN SELF STORAGE IN REFORMING RENT-RATE INCREASES IN VIOLATION 
OF THE RENTAL AGREEMENT NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS, AS TO A REQUIRED 
THRESHOLD, PRIOR TO BECOMING EFFECTIVE. 
•'Owner may increase the Rent by notifying Occupant 
in writing at least 15 days prior to the first day 
of the month for which the Increased Rent is due. 
Occupant shall pay the Increased Rent from the date 
it becomes effective. An Occupant unwilling to pay 
the Increased rent may terminate the Rental 
Agreement as provided in Item III below." 
In order for an increase in rent to be effective the first day 
of the month it must be notified to the Occupant by the 15th day of 
the month prior to becoming effective. For example: the rent 
increase to be effective January 1, must be notified to the Occupant 
in writing by December 15. This must be so, for the Occupant to 
follow the remaining portion of the said Rental Agreement i.e. "An 
occupant unwilling to pay the Increased Rent may terminate the Rental 
Agreement as provided in Item III below.M 
"Occupant or Owner may terminate the Occupancy 
created by this Rental Agreement by delivering 
written notice to the other party of its intention 
to do so at least 15 days prior to the last day of 
the Rental Month." 
Consequently, the 15th day of each month constitutes decision day for 
the Occupant, given Owner periodic properly notified rent-rate 
increases whereby the Occupant would be required to move out by the 
end of the month if given appropriate written notice to the Owner of 
his intention to do so. 
The beginning of any month the effective rent-rate is determined 
by the proper notification requirement 15 days prior to that date, 
or the existence of the legal rate. For example: the rent increase 
notified on May 24 is not effective on June 1. The required 15 days 
prior to the 1st day of the month notification requirement threshold 
has not been met. Neither is the rent increase notified on May 24 
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effective on July 1. Since the rent for June is the same effective 
legal rent-rate prior to May 24th, which pivots on the 15th day of 
each month prior to becoming effective, in order for the occupant to 
make appropriate decisions as to occupancy termination. 
In the case at bar, the Utah Appeals Court clearly erred in 
affirming the requirement that the Appellant is to pay $80 per month 
for the months of May, June, July, August and September 1988, (R at 
56 p. 3 par. 14) resulting from the improperly notified rent-rate 
increase (App-8) (R at 70). Furthermore, the Utah Appeals Court 
clearly erred in affirming the requirement that the Appellant is to 
pay $94 per month for the months of October, November, December 1988, 
and January, February, March, April, May, June, and July 1989. (R 
at 56 p. 5 par. 29), since the appropriate legal rental-rate that was 
utilized and properly amortized (APP-16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 
26, and 27) which was made pursuant to the Respondent's appropriate 
rent-rate decrease (APP-17) that has never been appropriately 
increased since October 20, 1988, (R at 50 par. 13) and (R at 46 
par. 3). The Utah Appeals Court's reliance upon the Respondent's 
assertions (R at 56 par. 14 and 29), were clearly in err and a 
violation of the contractual notification requirements. 
A case in point states: 
". . . a foundational rule is that if there is any 
doubt or uncertainty in the language, it should be 
strictly construed against the plaintiff landlord, 
who furnished the lease and required the tenant to 
sign." 
Bonneville on the Hill Co. v. Sloane, 572 P.2d 403 (Uta^ 1977); see 
also Wolfe v. White, 225 P.2d 731, 732 (Utah 1950). 
ARGUMENT - ISSUE II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR 
AMERICAN SELF STORAGE IN NOT RECOGNIZING RENT-RATE DECREASES NOT 
SUBJECT TO RENTAL AGREEMENT NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS , AS TO A 
REQUIRED THRESHOLD, PRIOR TO BECOMING EFFECTIVE. 
The Rental Agreement makes no specific notification 
requirements, as to a required threshold, prior to becoming 
effective, for rent-rate decreases. Therefore, the appropriately 
noticed decreased rent dated April 20, 1988, to be effective May 1, 
1988, (App-4). Clearly changed the rental rate to $55 per month to 
be effective May 1, 1988. The Appellant in a proper and timely 
manner, pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Rental Agreement, 
(App-42) which states, II Rent: 
"Occupant shall pay in legal currency to Owner at 
the Owner's agent located at the site in advance, 
on the first day of the monthf the Rent for that 
month. Occupant agrees to pay a $7 late fee for 
all payments not received within 10 days from the 
first day of the subject month for which payment 
is due.H 
paid the Respondent's appropriately noticed decreased rent (App-4) 
on May 6, 1988, which was recognized, received, and accepted, then 
deposited in the bank on May 7, 1988, (App-4), by the duly authorized 
agent—with apparent authority. 
The case at bar denied the apparent authority—Ms. Audrey 
Hooper, (R at 65 p. 2 par 1, 2, and 3) which states: "Admits, but 
affirmatively alleges that the said agents had no authority on their 
own to reduce the rent." 
A case in point states: 
"It is a general principle of law of agency, 
running through all contracts made by agents with 
third parties, [the Appellant] that the principals 
[the Respondent] are bound by the acts of their 
agents [Ms* Audrey Hooper] which fall within the 
apparent scope of the authority of the agents, and 
that the principal will not be permitted to deny 
the authority of their agents against innocent 
third parties, who have dealt with those agents in 
good faith." 
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Harrison v. Auto Securities Co., 257 P. 679 (Utah 1927). 
Furthermore/ since the Rental Agreement did not have specific 
language as to rent-rate decreases as to notification requirements 
prior to becoming effective there is no bar, or requirement of any 
kind for the Appellant to pay anything other than the Respondent's 
appropriately noticed amount of rent in a timely manner. 
A case in point states: 
". . .a foundational rule is that if there is any 
doubt or uncertainty in the language, it should be 
strictly construed against the plaintiff landlord, 
who furnished the lease and required the tenant to 
sign." 
Bonneville on The Hill Co. v. Sloane, 572 P.2d 403 (Utah 1977); see 
also Wolf v. White, 225 P.2d 731, 732 (Utah 1950). 
The non-cash payment of rent at the decreased rental-rate amount 
dated October 20, 1988, (App-17) involves other issues presented for 
review. However the reduction portion of the issue is uncontroverted 
in any way (R at 50 par. 13) dated June 12, 1989, and (R at 46 par. 
3) dated June 16, 1989, with the same arguments as above. 
Furthermore, the monthly rental-rate of $40 per month (App-17) and 
the monthly rental value of the asserted $94 per month (App-14A par. 
8 and 9) must be differentiated since the rental value must pass 
through the required threshold, the appropriate contractual 
notification requirements prior to becoming effective, thus 
establishing the monthly rental-rate. This did not happen since 
October 20, 1988. Consequently, the effective legal rental rate is 
$40 per month for both units. The Utah Appeals Court's reliance upon 
the Respondent's assertions (R at 56 par. 14 and 29) were clearly in 
err and a violation of the contractual notification requirements. 
See Appellant's Reply Brief pages 1 through 7. 
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ARGUMENT - ISSUE III 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR 
AMERICAN SELF STORAGE IN NOT RECOGNIZING THE APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO 
PEACEABLE POSSESSION OF THE RESPONDENT'S PREMISES IN VIOLATION OF THE 
RENTAL AGREEMENT TERMINATION REQUIREMENTS. 
The Rental Agreement (App-42) which states: 
"Occupant or Owner may terminate the Occupancy 
created by the Rental Agreement by delivering 
written notice to the other party of its intention 
to do so at least 15 days prior to the last day of 
the Rental Month." 
No place in the record of relevant facts is there a document by 
either the Respondent or the Appellant that meets this required 
contractual termination notification requirement. Therefore, one has 
to delve into payments and case law whereby the possession issue can 
be resolved. 
The case Woodland Theatres, Inc. v. ABC Intermountain, 560, P.2d 
701, 702 (Utah 1977) states: 
"Where, by reason of a breach of a condition, a lease 
becomes [in default], the lessor is entitled to recover 
possession. He waves that right by the acceptance of rent. 
He cannot accept the rent, and at the same time claim a 
[default] of the lease." 
Therefore, applying this case law to the facts at bar, the payments 
(App-4 and 7) would resolve this issue of possession in favor of the 
Appellant and deny the Respondent's asserted claim, (R at 56 p. 3 
par. 14). Furthermore, in the same cited case it states: 
"A landlord seeking enforcement of a [default] must 
take care not to do anything which may be deemed 
an acknowledgement of a continuation of the 
tenancy. Any act done by a landlord knowing of a 
cause for [default] by his tenant, affirming the 
existence of the lease and recognizing the lessee 
as his tenant, is a waiver of such [default]." 
Therefore, applying this case law to the facts at bar, the timely 
monthly amortizations that were recognized, received and accepted by 
the Respondent (App-16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27) 
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despite the filed cause of action, (R at 74 and 71) dated January 
20/ 1989/ renders this issue of possession again in favor of the 
Appellant/ and denies the Respondent's asserted claim (R at 56 p. 3 
par. 14 and 23) commingled with the issue of acceptance/ is the issue 
of amortization/ since acceptance of cash may not be the same as 
acceptance of amortization. So one ponders the case Green v. 
Superior Ct. of City and Cty. of San Francisco/ 517 P.2d 1181 (Cal 
1974). [Please review the court's discussion on pages 1178 through 
1182] where it states: 
HIf the tenant can prove such a breach by the 
landlord [implied covenant to undisturbed access]/ 
he may demonstrate that his nonpayment of rent was 
justified and that no rent is in fact 'due and 
owing1 to the landlord. Under such circumstances, 
of course, the landlord would not be entitled to 
possession of the premises•" 
See also Jarvin v. First National Realty Corporation/ 428 F.2d 1082 
(U.S. CA 1970). 
M
. . . the landlord sued for possession for 
nonpayment of rent. Under contract principles, 
however, the tenant's obligation to pay rent is 
dependant upon the landlord's performance of his 
obligation; [implied covenant to undisturbed 
access].H 
The Respondent admits (R at 56 p. 3 par. 14 and 23) they locked the 
Appellants rent-paid storage unit doors for nearly five months, 
depriving the Appellant access to his business property whereby he 
could not earn any cash. Therefore, the State of Utah has allowed 
set-off and counterclaim as appropriate remedies for unlawful 
detainer action for possession/ White v. District Court/ 232 P. 2d 785 
(Utah 1951). The Appellant applied this case in (R at 29 p. 3) to 
no avail/ further applied in Utah Court of Appeals Case No. 890455 
to no avail. Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court states in King v. 
Firm# 285 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1955) that: 
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"Thus under some circumstances a tenant would be 
required to pay the rent or lose his rights to the 
property under the lease, although the landlord 
owed him more money than the amount of the rent. 
This possibly would not be so if it were undisputed 
that there was presently due and owing from the 
landlord to the tenant more money than the amount 
due and owing by the tenant or the rent and the 
tenant definitely claimed the right to offset one 
claim against the other.H 
The Appellant definitely claimed this right (R at 69) to no avail; 
the Appellant definitely provided timely and appropriate monthly 
amortizations (App- 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 27) to 
no avail. The Utah Appeals Court clearly erred in affirming the 
Summary Judgment against the Appellant on the premise that the 
Respondent was entitled to possession (R at 56 par. 12, 14, 16). 
ARGUMENT - ISSUE IV 
THE COURT OP APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR 
AMERICAN SELF STORAGE IN NOT RECOGNIZING THE APPELLANT'S COUNTERCLAIM 
RIGHTS AGAINST THE RESPONDENT FOR LOCKING THE RENT-PAID STORAGE UNIT 
DOORS FOR A PERIOD OF TIME IN EXCESS OF FIVE (5) MONTHS. 
There is no question that the Respondent-landlord locked the 
Appellant-tenant rent-paid storage unit doors, for in excess of five 
(5) months, (R at 56 par. 14 and 23). 
The Respondent's claim for locking the rent-paid storage unit 
doors sounds of fraud, discussed in ISSUE V of this Petition For 
Certiorari. However, the Respondent's claims do not comport with law 
and will not be discussed in this issue. 
The foundation of renting any facility from a landlord is the 
implied covenant that the tenant can come and go as he pleases, 
having undisturbed access so long as the tenant does not damage the 
property, create garbage, interfere with other tenants, and the rent 
is paid on time. 
In this case, the rent was paid on time (App-4 and 7), but to 
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no avail, because the landlord did not abide by his own implied 
covenant to undisturbed access discussed in the Appellant's Brief 
pages 29 through 34. Moreover, this is a violation of the Utah 
Judicial Code 78-36-2(1),(APP-31A) which states: 
"Every person is guilty of a forcible detainer who 
. . . (1) by force, or by menaces and threats of 
violence, unlawfully holds and keeps the possession 
of any real property, whether the same was acquired 
peaceable or otherwise . . . " 
The Respondent, is not immune or exempted in anyway from the 
unlawful locking of the Appellant's rent-paid storage unit doors, 
discussed in the Appellant's Reply Brief pages 11 and 12. 
Consequently, the Appellant is entitled to an appropriate 
counterclaim pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule No. 
13 (R at 69). 
The Trial Court's Minute Entries dated June 15, 1989, (APP-45) 
and July 20, 1989, (APP-46) denied the counterclaim right. The Utah 
Court of Appeals denied the counterclaim rights in each of four 
occasions: 
A. Order denying Extraordinary Writ—Case No. 890455-
CA, dated July 25, 1989, despite a similar ruling 
in White v. District Court of Utah County 232 P.2d 
785 (Utah 1951). 
B. Order denying Motions, Case No. 890461-CA, dated 
August 1, 1989. 
C. Order granting Summary Judgment affirmance for the 
Respondent, Case No. 890461-CA, dated June 5, 1990. 
D. Order denying Appellant's Petition for Rehearing 
Case No. 890461-CA, dated July 2, 1990. 
This i> a violation of each of the following: 
A. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule No. 13. 
B. U.S. Constitution 14th Amendment, equal protection 
of the laws, and due process of the law. 
HMany attempts have been made to further define 'due 
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process' but they all resolve into the thought that a party 
shall have his day in court—that is each party shall have 
the right to a hearing before a competent court, with the 
privilege of being heard and introducing evidence to 
establish his cause or his defense, after which comes 
judgment upon the record thus made . . . Thus, the essential 
requirement of due process is that every citizen be afforded 
his 'day in court'." 
Celebrity Club Inc., v. Utah Liquor Control Com'n, 657 P.2d 1293, 
1296, 1297 (Utah 1982) . 
In short, the Appellant is entitled to the counterclaim rights, 
which include a trial asserting damages for trover and conversion, 
for both his business property earnings, and the amending of the 
Appellant's Counterclaim Complaint for the property maliciously sold 
by the Respondent—in violation of the Appellant's PROPERTY BOND 
(APP-40, 40A), tendered and signed by the Respondent (App-1) July 21, 
1989, prior to the fraudulent, malicious unlawful disposal of his, 
his spouses, and his children's property July 25, 1989. This court 
must grant the Appellant's counterclaim rights as a matter of law 
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule No. 13 and the U.S. 
Constitution 14th Amendment equal protection of the laws, and due 
process of the law, and the Constitution of Utah, Art. I Section 11. 
ARGUMENT - ISSUE V 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR 
AMERICAN SELF STORAGE IN NOT DETERMINING IF A CONFLICTING UNSIGNED, 
UNFILED, DEPOSITION SUPPLANTED WITH THE ATTORNEY'S CANNED AFFIDAVIT, 
FOR THE SAME WITNESS, FOR THE SAME DAY, AT THE SAME TIME, AND 
NOTARIZED BY HIMSELF, CONSTITUTES AN ACT OF FRAUD, WHEN RELIED UPON 
AND UTILIZED TO OBTAIN A SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The facts of this issue can be reviewed from the record the 
Respondent (R at 56 par. 13.), the Appellant (R at 55), the 
Respondent declares (R at 53 on page 2), and states that: 
"Since the affidavit was prepared before the deposition by 
Plaintiff's counsel, it is only natural that some minor 
changes necessary to make it comport with the deposition 
may have been omitted." 
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Now# please review the Appellant's objections (R at 54 para. 3) and 
(R at 50 par. Nos. 4, 5, 14, 15, and 16) and the Respondent's 
assertions filed with the trial court after the minute entry dated 
June 15, 1989, (R at 46 page 2, par. 4). The trial court's ignored 
knowledge (R at 44 par. 7), (R at 45 par. 4) and the trial court's 
reliance upon the Respondent's assertion (R at 41 par. 4) and the 
Utah Court of Appeals' ignorance of the Appellant's Reply Brief 
Issues No. I and II that deserves more than the curt judicial whisk 
conveyed in its Court Order dated June 5, 1990, and July 2, 1990. 
There is no question that the Respondent's legal council knew 
that his previously prepared canned Affidavit was false, when 
completing the scheduled Deposition on April 29, 1989. Nevertheless, 
he escorted his patsy, duped-witness into another room with the door 
ajar whereby he instructed his patsy, duped-witness to sign the 
canned Affidavit (APP-5, 5A), just moments after attesting to 
controverting facts, in the scheduled Deposition, described in the 
Appellant's Reply Brief pages 1 through 7. The Attorney's intention 
and his hope was that of obtaining a Summary Judgment for his client 
by asserting reformation of the contract, to a previous rent-rate in 
violation of the contractual notification requirements, the 
Respondent's adamant claim of a mistake; thereby asserting DEFAULT 
in attempting to justify the locking of the Appellant's rent-paid 
storage unit doors. And finally, in providing evidence that the 
court would believe that there existed a DEFAULT so that he—the 
Attorney—could get pai* by the Appellant for his services rendered, 
instead of by his client. Perhaps his client believed that it would 
be cheaper to claim default, mistake and require the Appellant to pay 
contract reformation and moving expenses, rather than for the 
-16-
Respondent to pay moving expenses when retaliatorily expelling the 
Appellant from the properly rented facilities by forcey fraud, 
intimidation, and now wrongful eviction. This, in my opinion, is a 
violation of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule Nos. 
3.4.(b) (App-35) and 8.4.(c) (App-37), and the Utah Forcible Entry -
Forcible Detainer Statutes 78-36-1, 78-36-2. (App 31, 31A). Many 
an attorney has been disbarred for similar actions, and Mr. Lynn P. 
Heward should be no exception. Some relevant cases in point which 
should apply to the case at bar are as follows: 
"The use of evidence by an attorney on behalf of 
his client, in a court proceeding, of an account 
known by him to be fabricated, is a violation of 
the attorney's oath of office and is grounds for 
disbarment." 
RE Ernest H. O'Brien, 14 ALR 859 (1921). 
"Accordingly, disciplinary action will lie against 
an attorney for inducing a witness to testify 
falsely.H 
7 Am Jur 2d Attorneys at Law S 43 Pages 97, 98, and 99. 
Hence, the Affidavits of both Ms. Audrey Hooper, (APP-5, 5A) and 
Mr. Steven J. Nelson (APP-14, 14A) add nothing to this case because 
each reeks of conspiracy and fraud—all manipulated and controlled 
by, in my opinion, their crafty Attorney, Mr. Lynn P. Heward. 
Furthermore, I believe that the conclusionary statements made by each 
affiant in their Affidavits and notarized by their attorney, Mr. Lynn 
P. Heward, would fit very well into the analysis of Affidavits that 
would not be considered as evidence on a Summary Judgment Motion 
under U.R.C.P. Rule 56(e). See Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 859 
(Utah 1983); Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 666 (Utah 1985); 
Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Const., 731 P.2d 485 (Utah 
1986). Furthermore, see Rainford v. Rytting, 451 P.2d 770, 771 
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(Utah 1969). I believe the above rule as stated in Rainford v. 
Rytting should apply to Mr, Steven J. Nelson's assertions in his 
Affidavit par. 4. (App-14, 14A). See also Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 
1172 (Utah 1983). Applying these case laws to each of the 
Respondent's Affidavits as a minimum renders them impotent, against 
the Appellant, therefore, requiring reversal and remand for trial. 
ARGUMENT - ISSUE VI 
THE APPELLANT, HIS SPOUSE, AND HIS CHILDREN HAVE BEEN STRIPPED 
OP THEIR HOUSEHOLD, PERSONAL, AND BUSINESS PROPERTY IN VIOLATION OF 
THEIR U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 4th, 5th, AND 14th AMENDMENTS. 
The California Court recognizes minors are "persons" under the 
United States Constitution, and it is hoped that this court will also 
make that same recognition, set forth IN RE Scott K., 595 P.2d 108 
(Cal. 1979), whereby children's property rights must be respected by 
governments. 
The unlawful seizing of the Appellant's, his spouse's, and his 
children's property during the published absence violated each 
persons U.S. Constitutional Rights 4th Amendment, since each was not 
afforded "due process" guaranteed in the 5th and 14th Amendments. 
Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Com'n, 657 P.2d 1296, 
1297, (Utah 1982). Consequently, the property taken and disposed of 
was done so without appropriate "due process of law", and the 
Appellant, his spouse, and his children continually suffer. 
CONCLUSION: The judgment entered in favor of American Self 
Storage should be reversed and a jugment should be entered in favor 
of the Petitioner, or in the alternative, the matter should be 
remanded to the trial court. 
Dated this fH** day of ^fuju , 1990. 
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Respectfully submitted 
William L. Echols 
Plaintiff, Pro-Se 
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that a true and exact copy of the foregoing 
Appellant's Petition For Certiorari was hand delivered to Lynn P. 
Heward #1479, Attorney for the Plaintiff and Respondent, 923 East 
5375 South #E, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117, on this /J?^ day 
of vj aM , 1990• The sum of three copies, as agreed. 
William L. Echols 
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Fourth Circuit Court, State of Utah 
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
American Tor]' I n v e s t o r s d b a / 
American S e l f S t o r a g e 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
William L. Echols 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Dated 6 - 1 5 - 9 9 
Case No. 8 9 3 0 0 0 0 1 5 
John B a c k l u n d 
Judge 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Defendant's 
Motion to dismiss is denied. Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare 
Order & Judgment• V 
ciRpcijr COURT JUDGE . 
k 
"'"•.V. 
Mail copy to: 
Lynn P. Heward 
William L. Ecols 
Mailed by S. Wright 
923 E 5375 S. #E SLC, UT 8*117 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
733 N. 800 W. Orovo , UT 34 601 
Attorney for Defendant 
- HS) 
FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
American Fork Investors 
dba/American Self Storage 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
William E. Echols 
Defendant 
R U L I N G 
Civil No. 893000015 
The Court having received and reviewed Defendant's motion 
for New Trial, motion to stay proceeding to enforce judgment, 
Defendant's motion to vacate summary judgment, defendant's motion 
for temporary restraining order, and further, having duly consi-
dered plaintiff's Objection thereto; and being fully advised in 
the premises, now makes and enters the following: 
RULING AND ORDER 
The Court hereby denies each and all of the above referred 
to motions of the defendant. Defendant's (list motions) are 
hereby ordered denied. 
Date: July 20, 1989 
Ci/rcuit Court Judge 
tAfifi-Ht* 
F I L E D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS %JUL8 519*!G 
OOOOO 
William L. Echols, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
^r /C I^K of iht Court 
Wlrti Couruf Appeals 
ORDER DENYING 
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT 
Case No. 890455-CA 
Fourth Circuit Court, State of 
Utah, Utah County, American 
Fork Department, 
Respondents. 
The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied. 
Petitionor William L. Echols has an adequate and sufficient 
remedy for any alleged error by way of an appeal and posting a 
supercedeas bond. See R. Utah Ct. App. 3; Utah R. Civ. P. 
62(d). 
Furthermore, petitioner does not request any specific form 
of relief, or show that he will suffer irreparable harm absent 
such relief and the judgment creditor will not be prejudiced. 
Petitioner has also failed to adequately inform this Court as 
to the nature of the judgment entered by the trial court or its 
ruling which petitioner challenges. 
The petition is denied. 
DATED this 2 5 — day of July, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Y)J(***S. P. fctorjL 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
F I L E D 
rj Al'S r f 1389 
American Fork Investors, a 
California imited partnership, 
dba American Self Storage, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
William L. Echols, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTIONS 
Case No. 890461-CA 
Appellant's motions for "directed verdict," "new trial" and 
to "amend appellant's counterclaim" are considered by this 
court to be, in substance, a motion for summary reversal under 
R. Utah Ct. App. 10. Said motion is hereby denied and all 
issues are reserved for plenary consideration of the appeal. 
DATED this / ^ day of August, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Norman H. Jaclraon, Judge 




American Fork Investors, a 
California limited partnership, 
dba American Self Storage, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
William L. Echols, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER RE: BOND 
Case No, 890461-CA 
The respective motions of appellant and respondent for 
summary disposition of the appeal are each hereby denied. 
The "Affidavit in Lieu of Bond" filed by appellant fails to 
comply with R. Utah Ct. App. 6 and Utah Code Ann. § 21-7-3 
(1984). Accordingly, appellant William L. Echols is hereby 
ORDERED to file with the trial court clerk the proper cost bond 
on appeal, as required by R. Utah Ct. App. 6, on or before 
September 23, 1989. Failure to file the bond on or before said 
date will result in immediate dismissal of the appeal under R. 
Utah Ct. App. 3(a). 
Dated this 14th day of September, 1989. 
BY THE COURT: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
I » 
rfj^& 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
American Fork Investors, a 
California limited partnership, 
dba American Self Storage, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
William L. Echols, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 
Case No. 890461-CA 
Before Judges Billings, Greenwood, and Davidson (on Rule 31 
Hearing). 
The summary judgment of the circuit court is hereby 
affirmed. ^^^ 
DATED this & day of June, 1990. 
ALL CONCUR: 
^ 3 ^ ^ ^ 
JkfaTth M. B i l l i n g s , Ju 
>amela T. Greenwood, Judge 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
American Fork Investors, a 
California limited partnership, 
dba American Self Storage, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
William L. Echols, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 890461-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, filed June 20, 1990, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated this 'Pit/- day of July, 1990. 
FOR THE COURT 
ife? £ 2 ^ ^ ^ 
Mary tf Noonan, Clerk 
Ai </,-«. / far** 
F I L E D 
y^n Court «IAPP^» 
/ , / 4 ^ /tf' 
Certificate of Receipt 
of the law office 
of Lynn P. Heward, 923 East 5375 South #E, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84117, do hereby accept a true and exact copy of the Defendant's 
Notice of Appeal stamp dated July 20, 1989, at 1:29 p.m. 
In addition I take written notice pursuant to the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule No. 64F Valvar of bond or under-
taking—"In no event, however, shall such action by the Court 
relieve the party obtaining the same [American Self Storage] from 
any liability which may be incurred in consequence of the action 
taken by him, [them] for which he shall be and continue to be 
liable to any other person [William L. Echols] or party as fully 
and completely as if a bond or undertaking were in fact given.n 
NAMELY: the Auction to commence on July 25, 1989, at 
12 noon. 
Furthermore, I take written notice of the case, White v 
District Court 232 P.2d 785> in which the Defendant was allowed a 
set-off, Counterclaim pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule No. 13. However, in the Defendant's case this was 
denied by the Fourth Circuit Court—American Pork Department—• 
dated July 20, 1989* Consequently, an Extraordinary Writ will be 
filed with the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 65B(b), 
claiming the same relief granted in the cited case. 
Received on this __________ day of . 
1989, at time of . 
(A/>f-l) 
LYNN P. HEWARD #1479 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
923 East 5375 South #E 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Tel. 264-8040 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
AMERICAN PORK INVESTORS, a California 








Case No. 893000015 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
County of Salt Lake) 
I, AUDREY HOOPER, being first duly sworn, depose and say 
that: 
1. I am a resident of the State of New Mexico. 
2. I served as a manager of American Self Storage, 420 
East 620 South, American Fork, Utah 84003 from about July, 1986, 
to about the middle of July, 1988, while a resident of the State 
of Utah. 
3. While I served as manager, I made a habit of sending 
out notices to remind the tenants of the rental amounts coming due 
or overdue. 
4. On or about the first of May, 1988, I sent such a 
notice to Bill Echols. A copy of that notice is attached hereto. 
C fipf-s* 
2 
5. Unfortunately, I made a mistake in this particular 
notice, putting down the monthly rent he had been paying up until 
a few months before. 
6. Actually, there was no reduction in rent and never 
had been, and Mr. Echols owed the full $40.00 per unit per month. 
In fact, whenever there was change in rent, I always explained 
that the rent was being changed. I did not just send a notice 
with the new rent on it. 
7. When I became aware of this mistake, and particularly 
when Bill Echols claimed not to owe more than was stated in the 
notice, I explained to him on several occasions that it was a 
mistake, that there was no reduction in rent and never_harLbeen, 
and that he owed the full $40.00 per unit per month. On each of 
these occasions, the explanation was made in writing, a copy of 
one of which is attached hereto. Also attached hereto is a typewritter 
copy which contains the words which I wrote by hand in the said letter. 
DATED this Jc^ day of *A$/k ( ' 1***-
rlj\,..w •£,„> 
AUDREY HOOPER / 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this ?°l day of 
<„ & - J 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
LYNN P. HEWARD #1479 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
923 East 5375 South #E 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Tel. 264-8040 
IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OP UTAH 
COUNTY OP UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
AMERICAN PORK INVESTORS, a California 




WILLIAM L. ECHOLS, 
Defendant . 
AFFIDAVIT OP 
STEVEN J . NELSON 
Case No. 893000015 
STATE OP UTAH ) 
) SS. 
County of Salt Lake) 
I, STEVEN J. NELSON, being first duly sworn, depose and 
say that: 
1. I am a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
and the agent in Utah for the plaintiff. 
2. I am familiar with the procedures and actions of the 
plaintiff's managers in American Fork. 
3. The billing reminders such as the one copied on an 
attachment herewith for May 1988 are given only as a courtesy. 
The obligations of each occupant of the storage units are set 
forth in the applicable Rental Agreement. 
4. On or about September 10, 1988, I agreed on behalf 
of the plaintiff that it would waive all prior defaults provided 
(fyf-tH) 
2 
that Echols either began paying the current properly increased 
rent of $47 per unit, or moved his belongings out. 
5. No representative or agent of American ever physically 
entered any of the subject units rented by Echols without his 
permission. 
6. However American did follow the extrajudicial remedies 
provided for contractually and by law when there is a default, and 
denied Echols access to the storage units he was renting during 
the period of November 10, 1988 through January 3, 1989. 
7. Defendant Echols now has access to the property in 
his units so that he can remove the same, and has had such access 
since before he was served with the Three Day Notice to Pay Rent 
or Vacate and Notice to Quit on January 4, 1989 at 1:15 p.m. 
^ 8. The monthly rental and the rental value of the 
two units occupied by Echols is and has been at least since the 
first of the year $94 per month, or just over $3 per day. 
^ 9. In fact, in September 1988 when Echols was given 
notice that his rent would be raised to $47 per month per unit 
effective in October, that was the rate that had been charged to 




Residing at Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
^ 
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Owner, AMERICAN, is the owner of that certain property consisting of storage units at the location identified 
above. In connection therewith, the Owner by this agreement does hereby let and rent to the Occupant the above 
numbered storage unit(s) at the said location (hereinafter called "site") for the rental and the period of time above 
indicated and upon the terms, conditions and covenants specified on the reverse side hereof, and as to which the 
Occupant does hereby agree. 
I HAVE READ AND DO UNDERSTAND THIS AGREEMENT, 
INCLUDING THE TERMS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF, 
AND DO HEREBY ACCEPT THE SAME. 
I ACCEPT THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROVIDE INSURANCE 
ON THE CONTENTS OF THE STORAGE UNIT AS 
SPECIFIED ON THE REVERSE HEREOF. 
AMERICAN SELF-STORAGE 
I. RENTAL OF UNIT: In consideration of all covenants and conditions contained In this Rentr» Agreement including and baaed upon the information of the front, 
Owner hereby rents to Occupant storage unit as described specifically on the front oHhis agreement. It Is mutually understood by the parties that Owner la not in 
the warehouse business, nor In the business of storing goods for hire and under no circumstances shall Owner be deemed to be bailee or other type of custodian. 
Owner's employees have been forbidden from providing any services on behalf of Owner. Should employees of Owner provide services at Occupant's request, they 
shall be deemed to be agents of Occupant. 
it. RENT: Occupant ahall pay In legal currency to Owner at the office of Owner's agent located at the site in advanoe, on the first day of the month, the Rent for that 
month. Occupant agrees to pay a $7.00 late fee for ail payments not received within 10 days from the first day of the subject month for whioh payment is due. 
Owner may accept correctly drawn checks for payment of Rent. If a check is returned uncollected, payments represented by it shall be considered delinquent on 
the date originally due and shall be subject to the $20.00 Returned Check Charge plus late charges. Owner jnay increase the Rent by notifying Occupant in writing 
at least 15 days prior to the first day of the month for which the Increased Rent is due. Occupant shall paylhe increased Rent from the date it becomes effective. 
An Occupant unwilling to pay the increased Rent may terminate the Rental Agreement as provided in item III below. 
III. PERIOD OF OCCUPANCY: The Period of Occupancy created by this Rental Agreement shall begin as of the date of this Rental Agreement and shall continue 
from month to month. Occupant or Owner mmy terminate the Occupancy created by this Rental Agreement by delivering written notice to the other party of its in-
tention to do so at least 15 days prior to the last day of the Rental Month. Property left in the Storage Unit after the termination date, and/or any property left In the 
Storage Unit at any time after rental payments are 30 days In arrears, will be deemed abandoned by Occupant. After said date Owner may remove any lock from the 
Storage Unit and dispose of the contents thereof without notice or liability to the Occupant. Owner shall give notice of Intent to dispose of said property to any par-
ty with an interest in said property of whom the Owner has knowledge either through the Leinholder disclosure provision of this Rental Agreement or through 
notice occasioned by a filed financing statement, as provided by law. Owner may also terminate this Rental Agreement by any other means provided by law. 
IV. RESPONSIBILITY FOR OCCUPANTS POSSESSIONS: Owner shall have no liability for damage or loss caused by heat, cold, theft, vandalism, fire, water, winds, 
dust, rain, explosion, rodents, insects or any other cause whatsoever. Owner carries no insurance covering any loss of Occupant's possessions. Occupant agrees 
to obtain and maintain a policy of fire and extended coverage insurance with theft, vandalism, and malicious mischief endorsements to the extent of 100% of the 
replacment value of the property in the Storage Unit. To the extent Occupant does not maintain such insurance. Occupant agrees to "self insure" the property to 
the extent of its Full Value. Owner shall not be liable to Occupant or Occupants invitees for personal injuries or damage to personal property caused by any act or 
negligence of any person on the Site. Occupant hereby agrees to indemnify and hold harmless the Owner from any and ail claims for damages to property or per-
sonal injury and costs including attorney's fees arising from the Occupant's use of the premises. Owner shall not be deemed to either expressly or Impliedly pro-
vide any security protection to Occupant's property maintained at the Site. Any security devices which Owner may maintain at the Site are for Owner's conve-
nience only. Owner may also terminate this Rental Agreement by any other means provided by law. 
V. PERFORMANCE AND GOOD CARE DEPOSIT: Occupant has paid the Performance and Good Care Deposit referenced on the front of this agreement. The Perfor-
mance and Good Care Deposit, without interest, shall be returned to Occupant within 30 days after the Termination of Occupancy if, but only If, payment of all 
sums owing by Occupant are received by Owner, if the Storage Unit is surrendered by Occupant in a "broom clean" condition and damage free. Performance and 
Good Care Deposits may be commingled with funds In Owner's general account. Owner may, at its option, deduct from the Performance and Good Care Deposit 
any unpaid charges, damages or rent due without notice to Occupant. Should the total deduction exceed the amount of the Performance Deposit Occupant shall 
pay Owner the amount of such excess. 
0 
VI. USE OF THE STORAGE UNIT: Occupant shall comply with all government laws, rules and regulations regarding use of the Storage Unit. Occupant shall not use 
such Unit to store any flammable, combustible, explosive, corrosive, perishable, noxious or dangerous materials. Occupant shall not place any signs or markers 
about the Unit. Occupant shall not use the Storage Unit for residential purposes. OCCUPANT WARRANTS THAT ALL ITEMS PLACED BY OCCUPANT IN THE 
STORAGE UNIT SHALL BE OCCUPANT'S OWN PROPERTY, FREE OF ALL INTERESTS OR LIENS OF ANY LIENHOLDERS EXCEPT THOSE WHICH AS REQUIRED 
BY LAW, OCCUPANT HAS DISCLOSED IN THIS RENTAL AGREEMENT OR.IN SUBSEQUENT WRITTEN NOTICE TO THE OWNER. All personal property located In 
the Storage Unit shall be subject to enforcement of the Owner's lien for rent, labor or other charges in relation to the personal property and for expenses necessary 
for its preservation or reasonably incurred in its sale or other disposition, as provided by law. Occupant shall not place any personal property or material outside 
his Storage Unit. Any personal property or material found outside any Storage Unit shall conclusively be presumed to be abandoned and may be disposed of by 
Owner without any liability of Owner to Occupant. Occupant must keep Occupant's Storage Unit locked and provide his own lock and key. Occupant may place on-
ly one lock on Occupant's Storage Unit and hereby authorized Owner to remove any additional locks by cutting or sawing the same from the latching device for 
such Storage Unit. 
VII. DELIVERY OF NOTICE: Occupant's address shall be conclusively presumed to be the address provided by Occupant in this Rental AGreement unless Occu-
pant provides Owner with a subsequent written notice of a change of address. All notices required or permitted by this Rental Agreement shall be presumed 
delivered when either delivered in person or deposited with United States Postal service properly addressed with postage prepaid, except as otherwise provided by 
law. 
VIII. DEFAULT BY OCCUPANT: Time is of the essence in the performance of obligations created by this Rental Agreement. Failure of the Occupant to perform in a 
timely manner any obligation or duty set forth in this Rental Agreement shall constitute Default and Owner may proceed to do any or ail of the following: 
a. Terminate Occupant's right of possession of the Storage Unit by any lawful means. 
b. Deny Occupant access to the personal property. 
c. Provide written notice of the default and the Owner's claim to the Occupant, to any leinholder with an interest in the property of whom the Owner has knowledge, 
either through disclosure provisions in this Rental Agreement or through notice occasioned by a validly filed financing statement of the Owner's claim, a brief and 
general description of the personal property subject to the Owner's lien, notification of denial of access to the personal property, a demand for payment, and a 
statement that, unless the claim is paid within the time stated, the personal property will be sold or otherwise disposed of, as provided by law. 
d. Take appropriate action to enforce the Owner's lien rights as is provided by law. LIEN: UTAH LAW GRANTS TO THE OWNER OF A STORAGE FACILITY A LIEN 
ON GOODS STORED. IT STATES THAT, "ALL ARTICLES STORED UNDER THE TERMS OF A RENTAL AGREEMENT, AND CHARGES NOT HAVING BEEN PAID 
FOR A CONTINUOUS 30 DAYS PERIOD WILL BE SOLD OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF TO PAY CHARGES." (Utah Commercial Code 38-8-1.). 
In addition to the overage amount represented by the Owner's lien, Occupant shall be obligated to Owner for all costs, charges, fees or expenses associated with 
enforcement by Owner of its rights including without limitation, reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, service of process fees, appraisal fees and any and all 
other costs, as provided by law. 
IX. MISCELLANEOUS: a. If any portion of this Rental Agreement for any reason is declared invalid, such decision shall not affect the validity of any remaining por-
tion of the Rental Agreement. 
b. All the provisions hereof shall apply to, bind and obligate the heirs, personal representatives, successors, assigns, agents and representatives of the parties 
hereto. 
c. The provisions of this Rental Agreement and the right of the parties hereto shall be construed In accordance with applicable law of the State of Utah, Including, 
but not limited to provisions relating to Self-Service Storage Regulation, Utah Code Annotated 38-8-1 through 38-8-5. 
d. No waiver by Owner, its agents, representatives or employees of any breach or default in the performance of any covenant, condition or term contained herein 
shall constitute a waiver of any subsequent breach or default in the performance of the same or any other covenant, condition or term hereof. 
e. No subletting of the Occupant's Storage Unit or any portion thereof or assignment of this Rental Agreement by Occupant is permitted. 
f. The heading of the various provisions of this Rental Agreement have been included only for the convenience of the parties and are not to be used in ascertaing 
the intentions of the parties. 
g. This Rental Agreement is the complete and only agreement between the parties and supersedes any prior written or oral agreement. No amendment or altera-
tion shall be binding unless made in writing and signed by both parties . 
DISCLOSURE OF LIENHOLDERS 
Item Lienholder 
Item Lienholder 
Occupant represents that he has read and understands the foregoing Rental Agreement, including the terms on the reverse side hereof and agrees to be bound by 
all provisions therein. Occupant also represents that he has personal knowledge of ail information supplied by him and contained herein and that such informa-
tion is true and complete. Occupant personally guarantees prompt payment of rents. Occupant has received a fully completed and signed copy of this Rental 
"ZTM* ,?*(?*J. : 
Occupant's Signature ^ ^ 
